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Personal Injury
REFORMING THE TORT SYSTEMt

The first volume of this Report presented a reasonably detailed
map of the manner in which the tort system and related institutions
have addressed the human and social concerns engendered by personal injuries that are the outgrowth of modern enterprise. In this
volume we develop a variety of approaches to reform of the tort system. These approaches are designed to improve the performance of
the system in its own right and to define better relations with tort
law's institutional neighbors. Unlike the other studies that have
emerged from various quarters in the aftermath of the recent tort
crisis, in this Report we base our proposals on a set of principles that
respond to the legitimate needs of both the victims of enterprise injuries and the targets of tort litigation.
I.

THE COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE

It may be useful to summarize the major lessons we have drawn
from the institutional analysis developed in the various chapters of
the companion volume. The first lesson is that lurking beneath the
surface of the liability insurance crisis of the mid-eighties were serious difficulties in the operation of the tort system. In the areas of
high-stakes tort litigation that are the focus of this Study, total premiums for product and medical liability insurance trebled in just two
to three years in the middle of the decade, and coverage for environmental liability became unavailable at any price. Although certain
features and flaws of the insurance industry's own methods of pricing bear a major responsibility for the erratic trajectory that liability
premiums followed during the last decade, real growth in the total
t Excerpted from 2 AMERICAN LAw INSTITUTE, REPORTER'S STUDY ON
ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY FOR PERSONAL INJURY 3-29 (1991). Copyright 1991 by the
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litigation burden underlies and helps explain the huge cumulative
rise in premium costs which took place during that period.
Second, the most significant component of this growth appears to
have been an increase in the severity rather than in the frequency of
tort litigation-in other words, in the total amount of damages paid
rather than in the number of claims filed and pursued. Personal injury damage awards of seven, eight, and even nine figures, comprising not simply reimbursement of financial losses but also
compensation for a variety of forms of "pain and suffering" of the
victim and family, as well as occasional huge punitive levies, all help
to explain what otherwise might appear to have been sudden overreactions by insurers and enterprises to the actual cumulative increase in tort costs over the last ten to twenty years.
Third, there appears to be little or no foundation for the common
diagnosis that erosion of the fault principle as the basis of tort liability has attracted surplus numbers of dubious claims into the tort system. It is revealing, for example, to analyze recent liability trends
from the comparative perspective afforded by workers' compensation, a system characterized by a far stronger mode of absolute liability than was ever contemplated for tort. Even though employer
liability costs for workers' compensation have grown steadily and
substantially for two decades, the sudden lurches in premiums and
drying up of coverage that marked high-stakes tort litigation did not
occur. Meanwhile, within the tort system itself a growing body of
empirical research demonstrates that the number of tort claims filed
is much smaller than the number of tortious injuries actually inflicted. A less visible but equally distressing liability "crisis," then,
arises from the fact that deserving victims with legitimate claims
continue to face high barriers to obtaining tort redress.
Recognizing that this sizable compensation gap exists side by side
with the onerous liability burden that has preoccupied most popular
political discussion of this subject makes the task of designing a fair
and sensible tort regime far more difficult and delicate. The complexity is accentuated by examining tort's performance in pursuit of
its several objectives.
On the one hand, tort litigation responds to the popular sentiment
that fairness requires that those guilty of wrongdoing be held to account for the harm they have done. At the same time, tort litigation
as a mode of private redress does deliver some necessary compensation into the hands of seriously injured victims, and the prospect of
litigation and liability appears to reduce somewhat the likelihood
that risky behavior will take place and resulting future injuries will
occur.

On the other hand, many analysts have serious reservations about
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the merits of using the costly litigation process as a response to populist grievances about the defendant's "outrageous misconduct," particularly since the focus of liability is an impersonal organization,
and the costs of the liability are often borne by the pool of potential
victim sin the form of liability insurance buried in the price of goods
and services purchased from the enterprise. Moreover, using a liability regime to redress and distribute the risks of enterprise-related
injury creates in effect a type of loss insurance that is badly skewed
in design and terribly expensive to administer. Finally, although attributing the costs of accidents to the actors or enterprises responsible appears to engender at least a modest level of future injury
prevention, it remains unclear whether this additional protection
comes at too great a price in defensive medicine, reduced product
innovation, and generally higher costs of doing business in an increasingly competitive international economy-all this is a world in
which no other nation has a liability regime of anywhere near the
magnitude of our own.
Conscious of these concerns, the participants on this Project spent
much time in its early stages exploring the potential of alternative
institutions for addressing the personal injury problem-competitive
markets, public and private loss insurance, and administrative health
and safety regulation. As so often happens, the evident imperfections
of tort litigation that re revealed when the system is viewed against
an absolute ideal became somewhat less striking when tort was compared to the actual performance of the alternative regimes. As we
indicated in the chapters devoted to these institutions in the first volume, each system makes a vital contribution to personal injury policy. However, each in turn has its own characteristic failings, well
known to specialists in the respective areas. These limitations help
explain why, for example, the United States has no comprehensive
insurance against the earnings lost by those who are permanently
but partially disabled, and why government regulation has been able
to target only a tiny handful of hazards to our health and safety.
This canvass of the broader institutional constellation of which
tort law is one component eventually brought us to two conclusions.
First, it is essential to avoid a "tort-centric" approach to personal
injury policy. The lawyers, judges, and legislators responsible for the
evolution of the tort system must be far more conscious than they
have ever been of the need to dovetail their doctrinal and procedural
innovations in tort with what is happening in outside regimes that

often dwarf tort litigation in magnitude and effect. Indeed, sometimes the appropriate solution to ticklish litigation questions is to remove the problem from the tort regime altogether and deal with it
elsewhere.
Second, notwithstanding how appropriate this more modest view
of tort law's capacity may be, the fact remains that tort plays a valuable role in thd broader personal injury picture. A mode of civil liability that is shaped by judges and juries and privately enforced by
victims against those responsible for hazardous activities in an essential mechanism for handling the many problems-some old, some
new-that are not adequately dealt with in either the marketplace or
the political arena. It is important, then, that our tort system be
properly designed to play its part in a pluralistic personal injury
universe.
II. PRINCIPLES FOR REFORM
This volume presents our judgements about and proposals for the
future evolution of the tort system and its institutional relationships.
Each chapter deals in depth with a particular problem area, including the arguments and recommendations we make for legal reform.
As a prelude to these detailed analyses we now offer an overview of
our approach and a synopsis of all our proposals.
We note at the outset that while the background studies summarized in the prior volume canvassed the entire array of personal injury institutions, our policy prescriptions in this volume are largely
devoted to tort law alone. As a group of tort scholars, that is where
our comparative advantage lies. The more we learned about the
problems as well as the virtues of disability insurance, for example,
the more we realized how presumptuous it would be for us to judge
whether Social Security Disability Insurance might be expanded to
cover partial as well as total disability. At the same time, we focused
on a number of key areas in which the tort system intersects with
these other institutions. As a result, we make a variety of recommendations-for example, advocating a regulatory compliance defense-to establish more sensible boundary lines between the two
sectors and consequently to allow tort decision makes to take better
advantage of what the other regimes have to offer.
Even within the tort system we have not attempted to cover every
improvement that could be made. In order to produce a report that
was of manageable length and yet that did justice to the issues addressed, we had to be selective. We focused on proposals that should
be debated seriously in both courts and legislatures during the next
decade; as a consequence we omitted ideas that are intellectually appealing to at least some of us, but that are likely, at least for the
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foreseeable future, to be debated only the law reviews. We have also
concentrated our attention on proposals that promise to exert substantial leverage on the overall functioning of the tort litigation/liability insurance regime, thus excluding a number of interesting but
rather peripheral issues (such as informed consent in medical malpractice) that are the stuff of routine appellate court opinions and
legislative enactments.
The recommendations we arrived at were not worked through to
the level of detail found in a Restatement or in a statute. The bulk of
each chapter is devoted to presentation of the problem the pros and
cons of alternative solutions, and the arguments for the direction
that we favor. We attempted to flesh out our proposals sufficiently to
provide assurance they are workable and to address the major questions each might raise. But our aim has been to put forward a number of key ideas for adoption within the tort system-for example, a
scale for pain and suffering damages-not to specify a precise
blueprint that should be adhered to in every jurisdiction where it
might be adopted.
Our most important objective has been to ensure that our diagnoses and prescriptions are principled and nonpartisan. In particular
we wanted to avoid the tendency of tort "reformers" in the last decade to assume that the "problem" (indeed, the "crisis") in the tort
system consists simply in businesses facing too many legal claims
and burdensome insurance premiums. The research we reviewed and
distilled for this Report has driven home to us how many people suffer serious personal injuries and how often these victims do not have
ready access to a legal system that can provide effective redress. It is
true that the targets of litigation have legitimate objections to much
of the treatment they receive under the contemporary tort system,
and we offer a number of proposals for appropriate relief in the definition of liability and the scope of damages. But where the principles
we found persuasive call for expansion instead of contraction of tort
liability, we emphatically endorse enlarging protection offered to injury victims who are the intended beneficiaries of the tort system.
This philosophy is visible, for example, in our analysis of the various components of the tort award.' Our judgement is that the law
1. A simply but graphic illustration, not addressed in the main body of this Report,
concerns the recent move to substitute periodic payments for lump sum tort awards. The
aim of that statutory change is to take the guesswork out of jury estimates of the future
life (or disability) of the victim. Almost invariably, though, the enactments focus on the
case of the victim who dies earlier than the jury anticipated, with the result that the
unexpended portion of the jury award is a windfall bequest to the victim's heirs. Only
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relating to tort damages has generated greater legitimate concerns
than have the underlying standards of substantive liability. The current open-ended process of jury damage determination produces
awards that are customarily unpredictable, occasionally far too large
(and sometimes too small), and that channel disproportionate sums
into payment for nonpecuniary injuries such as pain and suffering, as
well as into punitive damages. We favor the basic principle that the
primary (although not the exclusive) role for tort damages is to compensate injured victims for the actual financial losses they suffer as a
result of personal injury. This principle would reorient the limited
resources of the tort system toward pecuniary losses, the area in
which the victim's needs are most pressing and insurability by defendant enterprises is most viable. The implications are (1) that payments received from other sources of insurance should be offset
against the tort award (see Chapters 6 and 7), and (2) that while
pain and suffering and punitive damages should be retained, meaningful legal criteria should guide and constrain juries in the awards
they make under each of these headings (see Chapters 8 and 9).
Having accepted the pecuniary loss principle, however, we realized
that one critical item of financial loss was not being compensated by
the tort system except sub rosa through "excess" damages awarded
for pain and suffering or by ignoring collateral source payments.
This damage gap stems from the sizable legal cost borne by victims
who seek redress for their injuries. A key component of our proposed
recasting of tort damages, then, is the extension of the award to include this distinct tangible harm inflicted on the victims of tortious
actions by defendants (see Chapter 10).
Even though we are not convinced that substantive standards of
tort liability are as crucial to the operation of the litigation/insurance regime as law school courses and casebooks make them out to
be, a number of important and troublesome features are nevertheless
visible in current tort doctrine. Interestingly, the supposed erosion of
the fault principle is not one of these features. Thus, adoption by the
Restatement (Second) of strict liability for a manufacturing defect
in a product has occasioned nothing like the difficulty and dislocation
regularly experienced in litigation over design and warning defects,
two jurisdictions, Arizona and Illinois, have recognized that it is just as likely that any
one tort victim will live longer than he actuarial tables project, with the result that the
jury's award will leave a shortfall from medical expenses and the like: see Henderson,
"Designing a Responsible Periodic Payment System for Tort Awards: Arizona Enacts a
Prototype," 32 Arizona Law Review 21, 36 n.94, 46 (1990). To our mind there are real
virtues to this type of restructuring of tort victim's needs when death comes later than
expected as this legislation now accommodates the tort defendant's interests when death
comes earlier (and we note that the Uniform Periodic Payment of Judgments Act,
drafted by Professor Roger Henderson for the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws, does reflect that principle of reciprocity in Sections 4(e) and 7(g)).
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where the liability requirement is negligence, in function if not in
form. (The same point holds true of a comparison with medical malpractice, where the doctor's liability rests on an explicit and rather
narrowly defined fault standard).
As will be seen in the relevant chapters in this volume, a recurrent
theme in our legal diagnoses and prescriptions is the need to refine
the standards of tort liability so as to reinforce rather than to obstruct the valuable contribution that other institutions can make to
the reduction of personal injuries. In the product setting the complementary institution is an informed and competitive consumer market
(see Chapter 2); in the medical area it is a mechanism for peer review of the individual physician's treatment conducted under the
auspices of the hospital organization (see Chapter 4); and in a variety of injury settings, it is the regulatory judgments made and standards set by administrative agencies with special responsibilities for
health and safety (see Chapter 3).
As was true of our proposals regarding tort damages, some
(though not all) of the doctrinal reforms we favor would contract the
current scope of common law liability, for what we believe are justifiable reasons. Other proposals in this volume move in a different
direction.
For example, we reject the recently popular legislative trend to cut
back sharply on the scope of joint and several liability, a practice
that may leave innocent plaintiffs without recourse when one of several defendants turns out to be unreachable or judgment-proof (see
Chapter 5). And in the environmental area, we were struck by the
fact (sketched in Chapter 11 of the companion volume) that relative
to the incidence of fatal or disabling diseases that apparently are
produced by toxic environmental exposures, only a tiny handful of
tort claims have surfaced in litigation. Among the reasons for this
shortfall is the great difficulty (at least outside the asbestos context)
of establishing causation under the current "preponderance of the
evidence" standard. That led us to propose (in Chapter 12 below)
careful use of a "proportionality" approach to causation findings and
damage awards, designed to lower the present legal barriers to successful pursuit of claims for real environmental harms that need the
degree of prevention and compensation our tort system is supposed
to provide.
In the environmental area, as elsewhere, it is just as important to
improve the operation of the litigation process as it is to refine the
doctrinal standards that are applied in that process. One problem is

insuring ready access to legal relief by victims with legitimate tort
claims: our attorney fee-shifting and proportionate causation proposals are partial responses to this need. A second concern is the accuracy and predictability of court verdicts. We do support the
institution of the jury as a vehicle for lay participation in the dispensing of civil justice. It is vital, though, that juries be provided
with authoritative guidance in the assessment of tort damages, which
up to now has been an entirely open-ended process heavily influenced
by the manner in which the immediate situation is presented to the
jury be counsel. Not only would meaningful legal guidelines-relating to pain and suffering, for example-enhance the fairness of results from one trial to the next, but they would also provide
potential litigants with the basis they need to settle their cases without the expense and delay of a full trial. We also believe that it is
time for the tort system to recognize the inadequacies of an adversarial trial in grappling with difficult contested scientific issues. As a
result, we have mapped out ways in which judges can make use of
court-appointed experts or even specialized science panels to secure
better founded ruling son this issues (see Chapter 11).
. Perhaps most pressing of all is the need to avoid wasting the
scarce time of the courts and the scarce resources of the parties in
constant relitigation of common questions that arise in mass tort episodes, for example from defective product designs or environmental
exposures. To produce greater economy in use of the tort litigation
system, we recommend reversal of the current presumption against
class actions in tort. This change would also offer improved legal
access and leverage to the scattered victims who have to deal with a
large enterprise that benefits from a naturally unified approach to
multiple claims (see Chapter 13). In addition, we sketch the paths
that might be taken inside or outside tort litigation to handle future
mass disasters of the magnitude of asbestos, Agent Orange, and The
Dalkon Shield, borrowing and improving on the techniques utilized
by judges and special masters who have recently wrestled with these
cases, often as the result of a bankruptcy Filing (see Chapters 13
and 14).
Finally, we return to the theme with which we began: because tort
law is only one member of the extended family of personal injury
institutions, there is a pressing need for better definition of the
boundaries between tort and its neighbors.
We referred earlier to our emphasis on legal reinforcement of the
product market by enhancing the informational quality of product
warnings (see Chapter 2). In the damages area, we are satisfied that
tort liability insurance should be a second payer, standing behind the
cheaper and better tailored system of loss insurance. Reversing the
traditional collateral source rule and eliminating the subrogation
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rights of loss insurance (see Chapter 6) would also make an important contribution to the present contentious overlap between workers'
compensation and product liability for occupational injuries (see
Chapter 7). A similar concern about institutional overlap on prevention side underlies our endorsement of a carefully specified regulatory compliance defense for situations in which defendant enterprises
have relied on and complied with precautionary standards developed
by specialized administrative agencies (See Chapter 3).
More positively, although we defend and seek to improve the performance of tort law as a general source of redress for injury victims,
it is equally vital that we make greater use of other institutions
designed specifically for either compensation or prevention. Perhaps
the closest relative to tort is the no-fault administrative compensation model exemplified by workers' compensation, also a third-party
liability regime. We conclude that the no-fault model is worth serious consideration for handling injuries caused by medical treatment,
though probably on an initial elective basis (see Chapter 15). Although there appears to be similar promise in this approach for certain categories of product injury, particularly from pharmaceutical,
we are more pessimistic about the prospects for no=fault (elective
or mandatory) for consumer product injuries generally (for reason
elaborated in Chapter 16).
Later chapters canvass the possibilities for an implications of
changes in liability insurance (Chapter 17) an social insurance
(Chapter 18). Although a number of intriguing options are worth
considering and debating in those spheres (as well as in administrative health and safety regulation, which we analyzed in Chapter 8 of
the prior volume), there should be no illusion that these options
promise quick and easy relief for the problems that now beset the
tort system. That is why the program laid out in this volume for
systematic reform of tort law itself must be given serious attention in
the legal and political arenas.
III.

SYNOPsIs OF PROPOSALS

Having provide this overview of the approach followed in this Report, we now present a complete synopsis of all the proposals we will
make in this volume. We caution the reader that each set of recommendations has a lengthy chapter devoted to it. Each chapter's
broad canvass of the policy problems and competing legal options
may well be more valuable than the particular judgments we arrive
at about each issue. As lawyers regularly learn, however nothing so

concentrates the mind and sharpens an analysis as the realization
that one must commit oneself to a specific conclusion. The following
pages provide a summary, then, of the entire set of policy commitments arrived at by the Project team after five years of work.
LIABILITY STANDARDS

A.

Product Defects and Warnings2

1. For "manufacturing" defects, the historic focus of Section
402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, we endorse retaining
strict liability for defects that can ordinarily be measured against the
manufacturer's own standard of design.
2. As to defects in the product design itself, the courts should explicitly recognize that they are employing a de facto negligence standard in this area of product liability law, under which a reasonable
balance must be struck between the risks and benefits of alternative
designs in light of the state of the art at the relevant time. There
should be no separate "consumer expectations" test for design defects, nor any reference in this inquiry to the superior capacity of
manufacturers to serve as insurers for product injuries. We endorse
the caution recently exhibited by courts against presuming to judge
that the risks of certain products are so severe (even if unavoidable)
that they should not be marketed, even to informed consumers. From
this arises our proposal that a product design should be held defective only if there was a feasible alternative design which would have
avoided the injury in question without materially altering the consumer's expected use and enjoyment of the product, and then only if
the costs of incorporating this new precaution in the design do not
outweigh the human and financial harms from the injuries thereby
preventable.
3. For reasons offered in the discussion of markets in Chapter 7 of
the prior volume, we believe that competitive markets can make a
signal contribution to product safety, particularly when consumers
are well informed about the hazards presented by various product
choices. The law of product warnings should be recast and administered to serve this vital function of informing consumers. Risk level
warnings should be given for products, ideally through a standardized vocabulary that federal government agencies are encouraged to
develop, drawing on the model of the Food and Drug Administration. Instructions should also be given for proper use and are by consumers in situations in which these procedures are not apparent. At
2. See Chapter 2 of this title, together with Chapter 7 on Markets, Chapter 8 on
Regulation, and Chapter 9 on Product Injuries, all in the prior volume.
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the same time courts must take cognizance of recent research regarding the difficulty of communicating safety-related data in the
context of mass consumer transactions. Because of the danger of
dysfunctional label clutter when firms react to adverse judgments by
adding far too many warnings for ordinary consumers to assimilate,
courts should be more cautious about holding firms liable for failing
to instruct consumers how to avoid very low-probability accidents.
Finally, if a firm has violated its duty to provide the product warning
required by these improved legal standards, the court should presume that the consumer-plaintiff would have read and heeded the
warning that was not given.
B.

Regulatory Compliance3

Not simply in the product liability area but in tort litigation generally, a special problem has arisen in coordinating court judgments
concerning safety with judgments reached in the process of administrative regulation. We are satisfied that some form of regulatory
compliance defense should be recognized in tort litigation. There is a
persuasive case for making such compliance a complete bard to tort
liability, once certain carefully defined conditions respecting the regulation have been satisfied. At a minimum, such regulatory compliance should preclude the award of any punitive damages (where
compensation of the victim is not at issue) and should entitle the
defendant to an explicit instruction to the jury that compliance with
a regulatory standard creates either a rebuttable presumption or
strong and substantial evidence that the defendant's actions or its
products were not at fault.
Whatever the precise legal effect of this tort defense, the following
ingredients should be satisfied to make it available:
1. The regulation must have been produced by a specialized administrative agency with the statutory responsibility to monitor riskcreating activities in the area in question and to establish and regularly revise specific standards governing enterprise behavior. (The
relevance of statutory standards to tort litigation should continue to
be addressed through judicial interpretation of whether and what the
legislature intended to be the preemptive of preclusive effect of the
particular statute in question.)
2. The agency must have addressed the specific risk in question i
3. See Chapter 3 of this title, and also Chapter 8 on Regulation in the companion
volume.

the case at hand and have made an explicit judgment about what
type of legal controls are appropriate.
3. The enterprise in question must have complied with all the relevant standards prescribed by the Agency.
4. The enterprise must also have disclosed to the regulatory
agency any information in its possession (or of which it had good
reason to be aware) concerning both the hazards posed by the risk in
question and the available means of controlling the risk.
C. Medical Malpractice4
Although our review disclosed many technical issues relating to
medical liability standards that are now being debated, few of these
issues pose sufficient problems in the malpractice system to warrant
in-depth treatment in a report of this type. The major concern in this
branch of tort litigation relates to the level and form of damages that
should be awarded, not to the definition of legal "fault" on the part
of doctors. We do recommend, however, a broader change in the orientation of medical liability. The primary bearer of liability (and
provider of insurance) for negligently caused injuries to hospitalized
patients should be the hospital or other health care organization
under whose auspices the treatment takes place, rather than the individual physician with admitting privileges in the hospital.
D. Joint and Several Liability 1
A controversial doctrine that cuts across most personal injury settings and that has attracted considerable recent attention from legislatures is joint and several liability. We endorse this basic common
law principle as developed and recently expanded by the courts, but
with one qualification for situations in which ex ante contracting regarding such liability is not feasible among potential defendants.
Outside this contractual context, all defendants should continue to
be jointly and severally liable to the injured plaintiff. However, in
situations in which one defendant has become insolvent or otherwise
judgment-proof, that party's share of responsibility should be allocated among all parties involved, including the plaintiff, in proportion to their respective negligence or on whatever other basis of
equitable responsibility is used by courts for apportioning the loss
among the parties.
4. See Chapter 4 of this title, and also Chapter 10 on Medical Injuries in the
earlier volume.
5. See Chapter 5 of this title.
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TORT DAMAGES

We observed earlier that greater responsibility for the recent dislocation experienced in tort litigation and insurance markets is attributable to the principles governing damage awards than to those
specifying initial liability. Consequently, we recommend more extensive changes in this branch of tort law. The proposals detailed below
are all designed to reflect the principle that the primary, though not
exclusive focus of tort compensation should be to redress the actual
financial losses suffered by the injured victim.
A.

CollateralSources 6

We recommend reversal of the traditional collateral source rule, so
that the tort award would be reduced by any past and estimated
future payments for the loss from first-party systems of insurance
(with the exception of life insurance and other forms of insurance
that bear a close resemblance to it). In tandem with this reduction in
the size of the award payable to the tort plaintiff, there must be a
bar to any subrogation or reimbursement rights exercised by loss insurers against the tort award.
B.

7

Workers' Compensation and Product Liability

This setting present essentially the same problem of collateral
sources and subrogation rights, but with the special twist that two
liability systems-no-fault workers' compensation and tort-fault
product liability-apply to the same subset of occupational injuries.
The most widely accepted subset of occupational injuries. The most
widely accepted current rule gives the product manufacturer no
credit for workers' compensation benefits paid to the employee, and
instead gives the employer full subrogation rights to recover the
workers' compensation payments. In addition, even negligent employers are usually immune from any contribution to the product liability award. We propose, instead, that there be full offset of
workers' compensation benefits against the tort award, no employer
6. See Chapter 6 of this title, as well as the prior volume's Chapter 4 on Health
Insurance, Chapter 5 on Private Disability and Life Insurance, and Chapter 6 on Social
Insurance Alternatives.
7. See Chapter 7 of this title, and also Chapter 3 on No-Fault Workers' Compensation, and Chapter 12 on Workplace Injuries, both in the earlier volume.

subrogation rights to recover these payments, and no employer obligation to indemnify or contribute to the manufacturer's product liability. We also believe that serious thought should be given to
eliminating all product liability suits by employees covered by workers' compensation, but only if the value of workers' compensation
benefits is materially improved-in particular by indexing all longterm disability or survivorship benefits to the rate of inflation. If in
considering that last option there appears to be a need for some
residual prevention role for product litigation arising from occupational injuries, that role could be performed by allowing employers
to sue the product manufacturer for recovery of workers' compensation benefits paid for injuries attributable to a defective product used
in the workplace.
C. Pain and Suffering 8
1. We recommend retention of pain and suffering as a basis of tort
damages awarded directly to injured plaintiffs.
2. However, such compensation should be payable only to the victims of significant injuries, with substantial monetary awards paid to
the permanently disabled who can use the additional funds for adjustment to their disability and better enjoyment of life in a disabled
condition.
3. We oppose the type of absolute dollar caps on pain and suffering damages that have recently been adopted by statute in numerous
states. Instead, we propose that juries be provided meaningful guidance for the assessment of such damages through a scale of inflationadjusted damage amounts attached to a series of disability profiles
that range in severity from the most moderate to the gravest injuries.
D. Punitive Damages9
We propose a thorough rationalization of this area of tort damages, at least in the sphere of enterprise injuries. These recommendations relate to the substantive standards of liability, the principles to
be used in calculating the amount of any punitive award , and the
procedure through which punitive damages may be awarded.
1. An enterprise should be liable for punitive damages only when
there is clear and convincing evidence of reckless disregard for the
safety of others in the decisions made by management officials or
other senior personnel.
2. At a minimum the process for calculating the amount of the
8. See Chapter 8 of this title.
9. See Chapter 9 of this title.
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punitive award should be altered to specify clearly the relevant criteria, to exclude from consideration the defendant's overall wealth
(While permitting reference to the profits expected or earned from
the tortious activity at issue), and to require closer judicial scrutiny
of the size of the jury verdict. In addition, judges should have the
power to bifurcate the trial of these cases so that the evidence and
instruction specifically related to the punitive damage claim would
be put to the same jury in a second proceeding following a positive
verdict on the compensatory claim. Indeed, we believe that serious
consideration should be given to having the trial judge fix the actual
amount of such an award, once the jury has found that a punitive
award is warranted in response to the defendant's action.
3. Alternatively, a ratio should be established between the amount
of compensatory damages awarded to the plaintiff and the amount of
punitive damages permitted in the suit, with an alternative monetary
ceiling that would authorize a higher award in cases in which especially egregious wrongdoing happens to inflict only modest harm on
a particular plaintiff.
4. For large-scale mass tort claims, a mandatory national class action procedure should be developed to determine and distribute the
appropriate sum of punitive damages that might be awarded for all
tort claims arising out of the defendant's course of conduct.
E.

Attorney Fees 10

The foregoing proposals for recasting the principles governing tort
damages, especially our recommendations for offsetting collateral
sources and scaling pain and suffering, are advanced only in tandem
with this important proposal to expand the scope of recoverable
damages to encompass the reasonable attorney fees incurred by the
successful plaintiff. We propose this in recognition of the fact that
such legal expenditures are a distinct financial loss suffered by the
victims of tortious injuries. The specifics of our proposal are as
follows.
1. The reasonable attorney fees and other litigation expenses of
the prevailing plaintiff should be an independent category of compensatory damages payable by the defendant when the latter is adjudged liable for tortious behavior.
2. A procedure should be instituted under which the defendant
could make a formal "offer of settlement," with the consequence
10. See Chapter 10 of this title.

that if, after rejecting such an offer, the plaintiff did not fare better
in the eventual recovery, he or she would forfeit the entitlement to
attorney fees (under (1) above) incurred after the time of rejection.
3. The court should use a contingency-based percentage-of-recovery approach as the standard method for determining the amount of
the plaintiff's fee award, with the prevailing market percentages appropriately adjusted to take account of the constraints proposed earlier on the size of the underlying damage award.
4. Prejudgment interest at market rates should be included in
damage awards, calculated (if and to the extent it is administratively
feasible) from the time of the loss rather than of the filing of the
suit, with that entitlement not affected by operation of the offer of
settlement procedure.
ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY AND SCIENCE DISPUTES

The courts have recently been wrestling with a host of related
problems in litigation arising out of a family of cases that includes
mass product injuries, toxic environmental exposures, and various
other scientific-legal dilemmas surrounding causation. The following
recommendations address these concerns.
A.

Science Experts and Panels 11
To secure assistance in making accurate and credible findings
about complex scientific issues, judges should make more extensive
use of their power to appoint a court expert. Because we believe that
these science problems are likely to become increasingly difficult and
pressing in the future, we also recommend the creation of a Federal
Toxic Substances Board. This Board would not only serve as a
source of impartial science experts, but it would also take the initiative in convening "science panels" that would develop criteria for
more accurate, even-handed adjudication of these cases. In Chapter
11 we present a matrix of these kinds of issues as guidance for judicial use of either science experts or science panels.
B. Environmental Liability 12

We are persuaded that major legal and practical hurdles now obstruct the initiation of many potentially legitimate tort claims for
diseases caused by toxic environmental exposures. Remedies for
these barriers include not only the science panel just mentioned and
the class action measures proposed below, but also adoption of the
11. See Chapter 11 on Scientific and Legal Causation.
12. See Chapter 12 on Standards of Environmental Liability, and also Chapter 11
on Environmental Injuries in the companion volume.
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following specific features of environmental liability law.
1. As is now the case under CERCLA, tort claims for long-latency
diseases arising out of environmental hazards should not be timebared until after a reasonable time has elapsed for the plaintiff to
discover the disease and identify the causal connection between disease and hazard.
2. Strict liability should be recognized as the principal basis for
legal responsibility of enterprises that create substantial environmental risks which cause personal injury. This principle, based in part on
Sections 519 and 520 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts relating
to "abnormally dangerous" activities, should still permit a defendant
to avoid liability by proving that, given the state of scientific knowledge at the time, it had no reason to believe that its emission, waste,
deposit, or other activity in question was hazardous.
3. In situations in which the causal connection between toxic exposure and eventual disease must be established on the basis of epidemiological studies of large classes of victims, the amount of damages
awarded to any one claimant should be prorated in accordance with
the probability (as revealed by the epidemiological studies relied on
by the court or science panel) that the disease was caused by the
exposure.
4. In cases in which the toxic exposure has already occurred and
been identified but the disease has not yet manifested itself, courts
should entertain tort actions for the creation of a fund to pay the
financial costs of appropriate medical surveillance of the population
at risk, with full damages to be awarded (on the proportionate basis
described above) to victims of the disease when the condition
manifests itself.
C. Mass Torts 13

Mass tort litigation may arise from and produce difficulties in the
product as well as the environmental setting. We explore a variety of
possible solutions that might be adopted in either a judicial or administrative context. With respect to processing mass tort claims in
court, we present the following two models of reform.
1. We endorse the proposal advanced by the American Law Institute Complex Litigation Project and by the American Bar Association Commission on Mass Torts for expanding the existing federal
multidistrict consolidation procedure by authorizing courts to order
13.

See Chapter 13 on Mass Torts and Collective Judicial Procedures.

class actions for trial and post-trial as well as pre-trial processing of
claims; for the mandatory aggregation of claims pending in state as
well as in federal courts; for the disposition on a class-wide basis of
specific issues that multiple claims have in common, without regard
to the predominance of other individualized issues; and for the use of
class-wide disposition for resolution of the same issues in other
claims that have accrued but are not yet pending. Such a consolidation procedure would, however, include a carefully tailored right of
individual plaintiffs to opt out of the class proceeding for those issues
(in particular, the amount of damages) that turn especially on personal circumstances. It is our judgment that these procedural
changes are responsive to the barriers that mass torts pose to the
accomplishment of substantive tort policies, as well as to the concerns that such cases have raised for the administration of procedural justice.
2. With respect at least to large-scale, long-latency mass-exposure
disasters, exemplified by asbestos, Agent Orange, the Dalkon Shield,
and DES, we believe that even greater changes are necessary in the
standard individualized approach to tort litigation. In addition to the
above model of class actions, we envision a greatly augmented collective regime to handle such disasters. When triggered, this procedure
would govern future risks as well as already incurred injuries; it
would authorize insurance fund judgments to cover future losses predicted to ensue from the past exposures, and for this purpose would
calculate damages using schedules of average losses developed for
different subclasses of victims. Chapter 13 elaborates on the need
for, present experience with, and appropriate design of such extraordinary procedures.
D. Administrative Compensation Schemes 14
Our extended review of the experience and design of administrative compensation alternatives did not persuade us that this option
had a marked advantage over collective judicial processes, at least
for the general run of injuries. On the other hand, in any future
mass-exposure disasters of the type and dimensions of asbestos,
Agent Orange, and the like, we believe that the case for administrative no-fault is strong, even by comparison with a drastically reshaped collective tort regime as sketched above. If implemented,
such a compensation scheme should feature the following elements:
1. A Broad definition of "toxic harm"-that is, the compensable
event-that would include chemical substances for which an identifiable threshold of exposure had been linked with serious illness or
14. See Chapter 14 of this title, and also the prior volume's Chapter 3 on No-Fault
Workers' Compensation, and Chapter 15 below on Elective No-Fault Medical Liability.
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disease by scientific consensus.
2. Claimants would be required to establish exposure to a designated source of the substance in order to create a rebuttable presumption of harm.
3. The requisite exposure/source/substance connection could be
established either by reference to a Toxic Substance Document
adopted by the administrative compensation board, or by judicial referral the board when a court determined that filed claims indicated
the likelihood of a significant number of related, long-latency toxic
harm cases.
4. Compensation would be for pecuniary loss, on the model of
workers' compensation, with modest allowance for reschedule nonpecuniary loss in serious cases.
5. The tort system might be retained, but a claimant would be
required to choose between no-fault benefits and a possible tort
award. The tort option would be scaled down by allowing only scheduled damages for nonpecuniary loss and by reversing the traditional
collateral source rule.
6. The system would be financed, at least at the outset, by a flat
tax on the gross revenues of toxic producers.
Outside the mass tort area, we also believe that administrative nofault is a model worth serious exploration in the case of pharmaceutical injuries (a domain in which a version of the no-fault model is
already in operation under the National Childhood Vaccine Injury
Act of 1986) and with respect to medical injuries. As to the latter,
we recommend in Chapter 15 that hospitals and other heath care
organizations be permitted to establish on an elective basis a no-fault
patient compensation alternative to malpractice liability (within program parameters that would have been carefully considered and approved by the state government). In Chapter 16 we consider possible
further uses of this elective no-fault model for certain categories of
product injuries. Chapters 17 and 18 conclude with our analysis of
possible improvements in the liability and social insurance systems
respectively and the implications these changes may have for the operation of tort law.

